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MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890. By Charles
Fairman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. 456. $4.50.
ONCE every twenty-two months, if 'one takes an average of the 150 years
that have passed since the Supreme Court was founded, a new justice has
taken his seat on that Court. Many of the eighty-one who have sat there
are mere names today. The Moore who was appointed in 1799 and left in
1804, the Todd whose term of office ran from 1807 to 1826, the Curtis of
1851-1857 are as unknown to a profession which cherishes tradition as are
a Tyler, a Taylor and a Fillmore to an American public which learns the
names and dates of all its Presidents in the sixth grade. This is not true
of Mr. Justice Miller. However unfamiliar he was to Lincoln when the
President sent the ex-medical practitioner's nomination to the Senate, his
twenty-eight years on the bench during a period of almost incomparable
importance in the nation's history have made his name familiar at least to
the reader of the reports if not to the reader of the histories. Not until the
present book was published, however, did he acquire the dignity which comes
with a full-length biography.
The writing of a biography such as Miller's is a delicate task. Whether
it be thought of as a study in causation or as an account of the man's con-
tribution to his times, it is not one for a too vigorous wielding of Occam's
razor. The dangers that Max Eastman pointed out when he told us that
the writing of history "seems to consist of riding some strong idea through
a morass of facts that would bog you down and drown if you were not
mounted" are here too. But unless one is willing to forego all hope of finding
continuity, an attempt must be made to discover the main lines of behavior.
Put in terms of his reactions to the pressing problems of the day, at least two
such persistent strains can be found in Mr. Justice Miller's work.
One of these problems, of course, was Reconstruction. One can count at
least a dozen important cases with sources in the War itself, in the legis-
lation and Constitutional amendments which followed it, or in the carpet-
baggers who went South to administer the conquered provinces in which
Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Miller are to be found on opposite sides
of the question'- the one (as was appropriate for a would-be Democratic
1. I should include Cummings v. Missouri and Ex parte Garland (1867), Texas
v. White (1869), the Slaughter House cases (1873), Tennessee v. Davis, Strauder v.
West Virginia and the four other cases decided at the same time (1880), Neal v. Delaware
(1881), and Bush v. Kentucky and Ex parte Wall (1883) in this list. Of course there are
some including the Civil Rights cases (1883) and Georgia v. Stanton (1868) - in
which both men were on the same side. But in a multiple-ideal world, this merely indi-
cates that neither man was the monomaniac that Miller accused some of his brethren of
being in the municipal bond cases. Fairman thinks it unlikely that Miller's vote in the
Slaughter House cases "was impelled by a desire to uphold the legislation of carpet-bag
governments, for his correspondence shows him almost as critical of the corruption and
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candidate for the Presidency) seeking to ease the burdens of the South, the
other (who was equally available to the Republicans for the same purpose) 2
supporting the Reconstruction program. Some of Mr. Justice Miller's own
opinions reveal that he felt strongly about the War. There is a good deal
not only of the nationalist but of the Northerner as well in his dissent to
Cummwings v. Missouri and Ex parte Garland. He ventured, for instance,
"to affirm, that if all the members of the legal profession in the States lately
in insurrection had possessed the qualification of a loyal and faithful allegiance
to the government, we should have been spared the horrors of that Rebellion."
He was sure that there was no "implication of guilt" in requiring members
of the federal bar to take a test oath, "for it is required of the man who has
lost everything in defence of the government, and whose loyalty is written
in the honorable scars which cover his body, the same as of the guiltiest traitor
in the land." And he criticized the majority whose seeing an ex post facto
law in such an oath could be accounted for, he said, only in terms of "those
elastic rules of construction which cramp the powers of the Federal govern-
ment when they are to be exercised in certain directions, and enlarge them
when they are to be exercised in others," and which simultaneously deny
Congress the power "to prevent traitors practising in her courts" and give
the Court power to nullify a similar provision in the Missouri constitution.
Mr. Fairman's collection of the justice's letters to his brother-in-law in
Louisiana-a correspondence which was kept up for twenty-five or thirty
years, broken only by the Civil var- confirms the impression left by such
passages as these. Though just after the election of Lincoln, the Justice (as
he was soon to be) still hoped that war could be avoided, "that if disunion is
ignorance of Southern Republicans as he ,vas of Democratic intransigence," but he adds
a little later that his "great opinion" in those cases "was of a piece with his whole view
of the public policy of reconstruction." Of John A. Campbell, who had left the Court
at the beginning of the War and then returned to argue this case before it, Miller
expressed varied opinions. In 1870 he expressed sympathy and respect for hinm But
in 1877, when Campbell's reappointment to the bench vas being urged, he wrote: "...
I do not want him on the bench. . . . I think his course in resigning and giving to
the rebellion the full influence and support of his name and character and services should
forbid it. I could forgive him much sooner if . . . the confederate cause had com-
manded his convictions. But they did not. . . . Besides all this I have neither seen
nor heard of any action of Judge Campbell's since the rebellion which was aimed at
healing the breach he contributed so much to make. He has made himself an active
leader of the worst branch of the New Orleans democracy. Writing their pronuncia-
mentos, arguing their cases in our Court, and showing all the evidences of a discontented
and embittered old man, filled with the disappointments of an unsuccessful partizan
politician."
2. Though in 1867 'Mr. Justice Miller confessed that "if it be desirable that a judge
should not be a partisan, I am quite as near possessing that qualification, as any man
on the bench" and though ten years later he deplored the epidemic of presidential hopes
which blighted the Supreme Court, he was himself bitten by the presidential bug within
a few years. But he kept it well concealed and, after Blaine's nomination, on the failure
of which his hinged, forestalled the execution of "the nicest and quietest little scheme and
well arranged that you ever," he was yet able to say, "No one can say now that I have
ever sought the place or brought reproach or folly to the judicial ermine."
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determined on by any respectable portion of the South, the States which
concur in that design, will, instead of foolish invective and gasconading pre-
parations for war, . . . treat like sensible men on the basis on which two
nations shall be established," his post-bellum writing has a different tone.
Toward those who had rebelled he thought that "clemency, liberality, for-
giveness, and a restoration to their civil rights" should prevail, but only after
"they abandon their former leaders" and evince a complete willingness to
give up slavery and to support the federal government. That he regarded
those who rebelled as traitors, he spared no pains to make clear. But he was
kindly disposed- he would not put to death more than a "half dozen of the
most prominent and most wicked" of them, "for among these are in my
opinion many who have been governed alone by a selfish and wicked personal
ambition." For the other leaders -no more than twenty-five or fifty in each
State -his program was one of no pardon "until they have shown by a
proper course of conduct their loyal disposition" or, if this were not enough
and they showed "a sullen or an evil tendency," confiscation of their property.
He was, as he summed it up, not a believer "in the necessity or policy of a
speedy reconstruction," and he did agree with "the policy of committing the
political power of the rebellious states to other hands, than those which have
caused this rebellion."
A second strain which is consistent with a large body of his opinions is
a dislike for the more obvious manifestations of the money-grabbing, specu-
lative variety of capitalism current at the time - a tendency toward "agrarian
radicalism," Fairman calls it.4 He despised and protested against the new
uses of the equity receivership. He voted with the majority in Munn v.
Illinois and the other Granger cases. Coming from and riding the circuit
at the very storm center of the municipal bond cases, he entered the lists
against the majority of his brethren as they moved from doctrinal absurdity
to doctrinal absurdity in Gelpcke v. Dubuque - that case in which, as the
Court's reporter put it, "high moral duties were enforced upon a whole com-
munity" - and its sequelae. Sometimes he taunted them:
"It is attempted . . .to distinguish the case before us from those
just considered, by saying that the latter relate to what is rather
3. Fairman detects a falling off of bitterness in subsequent letters. But it seems
to be quite strong at least as late as 1869, when he was compla'ning of the South's
lack of self-restraint, its unwillingness to accept Johnson's moderate policies, and its
"fiendish hatred" for the Negro evidenced particularly in the "Massacre of Memphis
and New Orleans." Such quotations as these must not be taken to mean tl.at Miller saw
eye-to-eye with the bloody shirt portion of the Republican party, for other parts of his
correspondence show that he did not.
4. It is doubtful whether Miller would have appreciated the compliment towards
the end of his life. See his "The Conflict in This Country Between Socialism and
Organized Society," a commencement address at the University of Iowa, 1888, in
GREGORY, SAMUEL FREEMAN MILR (1907) 143, 169: ". . . it is to those who live
in this and the surrounding states, in which agriculture, with all its branches, forms
the great business of the people, that we are to look for the final defence to be made
against these agrarian and destructive doctrines." The address is, as Fairman says,
"an alarming discourse wherein anarchists, nihilists, socialists, communists, and single-
taxers are banded together in indiscriminate condemnation."
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ambiguously called a rule of property, while the former concerns a
matter of contract. .... If the deed by which a man supposes he has
secured to himself and family a homestead, fails to comply in any
essential particular with the statute or constitution of the State, as
ex.pounded by the most recent decision of the State court, it is held
void by this court without hesitation, because it is a rule of property,
and the last decision of the State court must govern, even to over-
turning the well-considered construction of this court. But if a
gambling stockbroker of Wall Street buys at twenty-five per cent.
of their par value, the bonds issued to a railroad company in Iowa,
although the court of the State, in several of its most recent decisions,
have decided that such bonds were issued in violation of the Con-
stitution, this court will not follow that decision, but resort to some
former one, delivered by a divided court, because in the latter case
it is a not a rule of property, but a casc of contract!'
Sometimes he cried out in anguish at the results of their newly-made doctrine:
"These frequent dissents . . . are as distasteful to me as they can
be to any one else. But when I am compelled, as I was last spring,
by the decisions of this court, to enter an order to commit to jail
at one time over a hundred of the best citizens of Iowa, for obeying
as they thought their oath of office required them to do, an in-
junction issued by a competent court of their own State, founded,
as these gentlemen conscientiously believed, on the true interpreta-
tion of their own statute, an injunction which, in my own private
judgment, they were legally bound to obey, I must be excused if,
when sitting here, I give expression to convictions which my duty
compels me to disregard in the Circuit Court."
Sometimes he lapsed into the sullen silence of a "Mr. Justice Miller dissents."
And more often than not -for some 300 of these municipal bond cases were
brought to the Court - there is nothing heard from him at all.5 There was
more than a little pleasure for him, one may suppose, when he could occa-
sionally convince a majority of his colleagues to set some limit to the rampant
doctrine they were building- that, for instance, a uniform construction of
the state constitution should be conclusive against the creditor, whatever might
5. Fairman makes no attempt to appraise Miller's manoeuvres in these cases, to
see how far his retreats are real, how far strategic, to inquire when and under what
circumstances he got support from some of his colleagues and what it was that occasionally
brought a majority of them to his side. This sequence of cases would appear, at first
glance, to be as good a place as can be found for careful observation of the judicial
process at work. And a word could be added, I think, as to Miller's conceptual technique
here. Was he not the doctrinal conservative, unwilling to invent new counter-doctrine
with which to match that of the erring members of the Court? For instance, was it
not possible for him to modernize the law of bona fide purchaser to fit the large-scale
marketed security and thus to take away some of the quality of the hand-to-hand
transaction which it has? Where there is a market with a "listening ear" -I borrow
the expression from Llewellyn-which catches the sound of doubts as to the validity
of such securities and discounts the price accordingly, can it still be said that the
purchaser is without notice? And had not Chief justice Chase already hinted at this in
Texas v. White?
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be the case where it had not been uniform or where there had been no con-
struction at all before the bonds were issued; or that the cases should be
confined to those in which "public purpose" could be found in the uses of
the bonds; or that, though mandamus to levy a tax would go against state
officers, the practical failure of the mandamus to raise the money was no
ground for equitable relief.
Here, too, the Justice did not confine his protests to the bench.0 For the
majority of his colleagues he had little respect in this type of case. "If I
were a practising lawyer today, my self-respect . . . would forbid me to
argue in this court any case whatever against the validity of a contract with
a county, city or town under any circumstances whatever. It is the most
painful matter connected with my judicial life that I am compelled to take
part in a farce whose result is invariably the same, namely to give more to
those who have already, and to take away from those who have little, the little
that they have." "Our court," he wrote at another time, "or a majority of
it are, if not monomaniacs, as much bigots and fanatics on that subject as is
the most unhesitating Mahemodan in regard to his religion."
All of this agrarianism, however, did not mean that Mr. Justice Miller
was prepared to let the states go their own unhindered way, that he was
willing to stick utterly to the doctrine of self-abnegation for the Court that
he preached in the Slaughter House cases. To say, as Mr. Fairman does,
that "he set his face against making the Fourteenth Amendment the basis for
a Naturrecht" is to speak an exaggerated half-truth. To the extent that
Miller was not with the dissenting minority in such cases as Munn v. Illinois
and the Slaughter House cases, it may be true. To the extent that he did
not protest against the dicta that were written into Spring Valley Water
Works v. Schottler and the Railroad Commission cases, his position is am-
biguous. But to the extent that he was the author of such a passage as the
one in Davidson v. New Orleans7 - ' . . . when, in the year of grace 1866,
there is placed in the Constitution of the United States a declaration that
'no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law,' can a State make any thing due process of law which, by its
own legislation, it chooses to declare such? . . . It seems to us that a statute
6. Nor did he confine his efforts to protests. See his letter of 1868: "I have been
devoting myself this summer . . . to an effort to compromise our city debt (i.e.,
Keokuk's] . . . It is indispensable to any progress in our town. If I succeed I shall
feel that I have conferred an immense benefit on my neighbors and fellow citizens, and
have added largely to the value of my own property."
7. Compare Loan Association v. Topeka: "The theory of our governments, State
and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. . . . No court,
for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B.
who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should
thereafter be the husband of C., and B. the wife of D." The matter is here discussed
without reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, only with a view to those "limitations
on . . . power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments," those
"implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact would
not exist . . ." It is only this aspect of the case which Fairman discusses. He does
not treat it as one of Miller's triumphs in the Gelpcke v. Dubuque sequence to which
it also belongs.
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which declares in terms, and without more, that the full and exclusive title
of a described piece of land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested
in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of his property without due process of
law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision" -it is clearly wrong.
Mr. justice Miller's letters are useful as well for the light they shed on
his attitude toward his contemporaries. Colleagues and advocates pass in
review: Chief justice Waite -"I can't make a great Chief Justice out of a
small man"; Chief Justice Chase -he "resorted to all the stratagems of the
lowest political trickery" to keep the legal tender issue from being recon-
sidered; Mr. Justice Swayne -"So much of it is found to be mere courtesy,
parade of learning, Turvey-dropism, with an absence of any real sincerity and
the presence of an ever watchful selfishness . . .," a man who "artfully
beslobbered the President" in an effort to keep Mliller out of the Chief
Justiceship; Mr. Justice Bradley - "a queer man. As Judge Strong said
the other day, 'If there is a principle on which a case can be decided that no
one else has thought of, it has for that reason a charm for him'"; Mar. Justice
Hunt - "not a very strong man in intellect" but "a cultivated lawyer and
gentleman," "a warm hearted courteous man" and "one of the most agree-
able . . . on the bench"; Reverdy Johnson - "that old political prostitute";
Attorney General Hoar - "An honest man, a little rude sometimes, and
thoroughly radical"; Jeremiah Black -"as a man . . . simply abominable,
but there was no one who appeared before the court to whom it was so
agreeable to listen."
They are useful, too, for the information they give on Miller's attitude
toward his own work on the bench. Sure that he stood with his party and
his country alike "as the best appointment to the bench which has been made
since the party came into power," he was .bitterly disappointed when he was
not made Chief Justice. But more than that, his letters show a growing
boredom with his work. Perhaps the first sign of it came in 1871 when he
admitted, "I have grown more averse to dissents." Certainly it was in full
swing by 1875 when he confessed that much as he liked "the law as a science,
its practice as a pursuit, and the office of Judge as filling my ambition . . .
its monotony begins to pall upon my taste and feelings." The same vein
recurred in 1881: "If it were not that for most of the questions which arise
I am able to decide without great research, and that habit has enabled me
to write with ease, I should feel the duties of the place very irksome, for I
feel no vivid interest in them." Still he could not retire. His brother-in-lay,,
reported a conversation with him: "Spent most of the day with the Judge
in his Library . . . The Judge will not resign at present- Says his wife
is strongly opposed to it, that it wd weaken their social position influence
&c-" For the justice, as for his colleagues if they also felt the same way,
one may guess that the boredom was that of a judge who knew the precedents
and had convictions but lacked all else. There is not the slightest evidence
that he spent any time in wondering about his place in the American scheme
of government, that he ever meditated on his function as lawgiver, that he
ever entertained doubts as to his correctness. The day of the great political
pamphleteer on the bench was over, save for a momentary flareup in the
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Slaughter House cases; that of the great introspective judge had not yet
arrived.
We owe Mr. Fairman a great debt for rescuing these letters of Mr. Justice
Miller. They make the book a far more valuable contribution to a study of
the post-Civil War Court than are Trimble's Waite and Swisher's Field.
But the study is still to be made. When it is made, it will demand more
attention to the Court's cultural inheritance from the Marshall and Taney
r~gimes than Fairman has given. It will need more concentration on the
surging stream of American life outside of the Court's walls than is here to
be found. And it is hoped, too, that when the study comes it will come with
more gracious language, less clumsy construction and fewer dull pages than
those with which Mr. Fairman encumbers the excitement that Mr. Justice
Miller provides.
T. RICHARD WITMERt
CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS. By Henry Winthrop
Ballantine and Norman Dunham Lattin. Chicago: Callaghan and Company,
1939. Pp. xxxii, 917.
FASHIONS in casebooks in the field of corporation law are constantly
changing. The present movement is away from comparative treatment of
corporations, partnerships, business trusts and other forms of business organ-
izations, save insofar as problems common to the law of agency are involved.
With this trend Professors Ballantine and Lattin's casebook is in tune.
At the same time, it provides a welcome alternative to the current vogue
for bulky casebooks. 1 Within the relatively small compass of 900 pages the
authors have produced a work noteworthy for compactness as well as for
completeness. Following traditional methods, they have succeeded in con-
solidating into workable form most of the gains of the past decade. The
book's weakness lies mainly in its limitations as a pedagogical medium. Built
somewhat along the lines of a textbook, it suffers from defects inherent in
works of that type. But it is, on the whole, a good all-around casebook,
popular with students, and a particularly practical vehicle for broad intro-
ductory courses in corporation law.
The casebook commences with a short chapter on partnerships, joint stock
companies and business trusts, which may be covered or not as the instructor
chooses, for its material is not essential to the rest of the volume. Where
Professor Steffen's Cases on Agency has been used in the first year, this
material will have already been considered. The remainder of the book is
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. E.g., FREY, CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1935), pp. 1331;
JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1937), pp. 1483; 1 BAHFR &
DODD, CASES ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1940), pp. 1306. To some extent these involve
different uses of material. A casebook built on different lines is KATZ, SYLLADUS AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1939), pp. 622.
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devoted entirely to corporation law, and presents every topic desirable in
an elementary course, with the possible exception of foreign corporations.
Problems such as dissolution of corporations and election and tenure of
directors and officers, to which the case method is ill-adapted, have wisely been
omitted. Likewise, specialties such as corporate reorganization and refined
aspects of governmental control of security issues have been left for advanced
courses. Questions of ultra vires and de facto corporations have been judi-
ciously reduced to their proper sphere. Again, these subjects will previously
have been treated where Professor Steffen's casebook has been used. Par-
ticular stress, on the other hand, is placed upon such topics as the managerial
functions of corporate directors, dividends and related problems, liabilities
of promoters, shareholders and directors in connection with the issuance of
shares, and charter amendments and mergers and consolidations. For the most
part the various subjects are taken up in the expected order, although, in
most instances, shifts can freely be made to suit the instructor's tastes. Indeed,
some alterations seem quite desirable. The chapter dealing with the share-
holder's derivative suit, which dangles at the end of the casebook, belongs
with the earlier chapter on directors and management; and Section 9 of
Chapter IX, which relates to sinking funds, might better be considered with
Chapter XI, whose subject is the purchase by a corporation of its own shares.
Professors Ballantine and Lattin supply the instructor in the typical intro-
ductory course in corporation law with an adequate and up-to-date body of
material. Of the 200 or so leading cases, approximately 45% have been
decided since 1930 and 75% since 1920. These cases have been severely
edited -generally for the best. The superfluous matter in which corporation
cases abound usually justifies a condensed statement of facts, at least on
grounds of efficiency. In some instances in the present volume, however, this
editing has made it impossible to grasp the complete significance of a par-
ticular case without consulting the original report - thereby making for
greater inefficiency. 2 In others, elimination of judicial language seems point-
less -as, for example, the deletions from Judge Cardozo's famous "mists
of metaphor" paragraph in Bcrkcy v. Third Aventc Ry.a Carried too far,
this process not only burdens the instructor but also bothers the student,
even though the latter may not go back to the original report on every
occasion.4
Through "text notes" and ordinary footnotes the authors have furnished
the instructor with an abundance of references to legal periodicals, other cases
and statutes, though in this respect the book cannot rival that vast and
valuable repository of corporate lore which is currently being produced in
CambridgeY The extremely abbreviated form of the extracts from corpora-
2. E.g., Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, p. 263.
3. P. 97. See also the omission from Goldwater z. Olman, p.27, at 29, of that
helpful sentence: "The law of trusts is just as much a part of the legislative palicy of
this state as the law of partnerships and corporations."
4. In answer to a questionnaire submitted to a class of one hundred students, 25%
stated they were frequently bothered by the editing of the cases and 53% reported that
they were occasionally bothered. Practically all of this 78% went back to the reports
in some instances.
5. 1 BAxzR & DODD, CASES ON BusiNzss AssocrAxoNs (1940).
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tion statutes seems entirely justified, for experience shows that better teaching
results may be obtained through the use of the supplementary statute books
which the various corporation services now furnish for many states. About
half of the fifteen chapters begin with introductory notes which serve to pose
the problems of the chapter as a whole and to discuss issues which the cases
do not raise. In other chapters, similar notes are scattered between the cases.
The many footnote citations, while valuable to the instructor, are so copious
as perhaps to discourage all but the hardiest of students. Some of them cite
too many authorities without attempting to distinguish the good from the
bad. It seems futile to refer the student to every law review note on a par-
ticular subject when reference to one or two really first-class criticisms would
satisfy.' There is also a generous supply of problem cases, which are valuable
only to the extent that the instructor emphasizes their solution.7 They are
particularly useful in this type of casebook as a device for raising contro-
versial issues in the student's mind.
Turning from the casebook's content to its worth as a vehicle for effective
teaching, the criticisms which follow must be considered in the light of what
is ultimately desirable in a corporation casebook. There probably is general
agreement that the unadulterated case method is less appropriate to the study
of corporation law than to many other law school subjects. Judicial opinions
in corporate cases do not, as a whole, lend themselves to dialectical discussion.
Moreover, much of the material must necessarily be purely informational,
requiring some sacrifice of controversial subject matter. If, however, a
substantial departure is made from the case method in the direction of the
text method, a substitute must be furnished which will stimulate the student's
thought and provide him with an opportunity for analysis. Otherwise the
instructor's entire energies must be directed toward releasing the student
from the state of mental doldrums in which he comes to the class-room. The
inquiry here is whether this type of weakness is present in the casebook
under discussion.
It seems, upon the basis of teaching experience with almost two-thirds of
the book, that the average student reading the materials prior to class may
be led by many of the chapters to believe that all is serene in the law of
corporations.8 This may not occur where he studies the stated problems
carefully, but only the rare student will do soY There are two chief reasons
behind this impression. One is simply that there are often not enough leading
cases to afford an adequate basis for comparative analysis. Neither the foot-
notes, as they are constructed, nor the stated problems are effective substitutes.
The second is the book's noticeable tendency to read somewhat like a text.
6. Possibly an extreme example of this are the notes and comments referred to
following Keller v. Wilson in note 21 on p. 763.
7. Upon the basis of the questionnaire referred to in note 4 supra, the class divided
fairly evenly on the usefulness of the stated problems. 54% found them helpful upon their
original reading of the materials; 67% found them more so after class discussion.
8. Of course there are variations in the different chapters of the book. This com-
ment hardly applies at all to chapters such as Chapter XI, which deals with the purchase
by a corporation of its own shares and related problems.
9. This statement is borne out by the questionnaire referred to above.
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The cases appear to have been deliberately selected with this purpose in
mind, and this impression is deepened by the "text notes" and footnotes.
The student therefore frequently comes to class without having devoted suffi-
cient thought to the problems involved. It is possible for the instructor to
spend days opening up the many possibilities of a single case, during which
time the student may be said to be "treading water." Emphasis upon the
reading of cited authorities may avert this situation to some extent, but,
even with relatively small classes, the demand for outside authorities will
invariably exceed the library supply.
While the addition of more leading cases would have the disadvantage of
increasing the book's size, a few more, if judiciously distributed, might be
helpful. A different selection of cases, especially cases which do not state the
law so explicitly, might also give the work a more controversial flavor.10
McQuade v. Stoneham, for example, seems preferable to Clark v. Dodge,
though both are valuable. And why pass up an opportunity to bring
the immortal John McGraw, his New York Giants, and Tammany Hall into
the class-room all at once? Likewise, Keller v. Wilson, already well-nigh a
landmark in the law, could take the place of Consolidated Film Industries, Inc.
v. Johnson; it would, in addition, provide further basis for discussion of the
important constitutional question so often involved in charter amendments.
But, as pointed out earlier, the great utility of this casebook lies in its
eminent practicality for introductory courses in corporation law. The criti-
cisms above will carry less weight in schools whose objective is chiefly to
offer a broad survey of the field. Where, however, more time can be given
to corporations the casebook does not furnish quite enough nor the best kind
of material for the exhaustive type of study which is desirable.
JOHN F. MECK, Jr.-"
CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER. By Roscoe T. Steffen.
Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1939. Pp..xxiii, 965.
By Friedrich Kessler*
WE have recently become very critical of the traditional law school cur-
riculum. We expect the author of a modem casebook not only to give us
the cases and materials which make up his field, but also to provide justifica-
tion for teaching the material covered in his casebook as a separate course.
Such justification is supplied if the cases and other materials collected enable
the student to understand and interpret sectors of social life in relation to
legal institutions. A casebook on negotiable paper has to convince us that
10. The questionnaire revealed some feeling, especially among the best students,
that cases might have been chosen which would have afforded a more effective basis for
class-room discussion. A majority, however, did feel the cases were adequate in this
respect.
,Assistant Dean, Yale Law School.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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there is a stronger reason than tradition for giving a course on negotiable
paper. The only good reason is that the material presents an adequate picture
of the financial organization of our society. Measured by this test, the con-
fines of the traditional course on negotiable paper become highly problematical.
Since bills, notes and checks are today "used as devices in transactions which
create and transfer deposit currency,"' a good argument can be made for
the plan to incorporate negotiable instruments in a larger course unit devoted
to commercial bank credit. Underhill Moore's promise to present us with
a new casebook arranged according to this scheme, which stresses the sig-
nificant fact that today the "manufacture of credit" lies in the hands of
commercial banks,2 opens up a fascinating prospect.
Mr. Steffen's form of modernization appears equally promising. His
casebook does not deal exclusively with traditional commercial paper: bills,
notes, and checks. It includes investment paper: bills, debentures, and stocks.
This fortunate innovation brings out one of the most significant character-
istics of our culture-the liquidity of our national wealth. It also invites the
student to contrast commercial with investment credit according to their
different forms of liquidity, and to study commercial (deposit) as against
investment banking. Thus, the casebook leads into very important aspects
of our credit economy. This innovation alone would be sufficient to make
out a good brief for a course in commercial and investment paper. But Mr.
Steffen's reforms do not stop there. Unlike the usual casebook, the first
chapter is not devoted to formal requisites of negotiable paper; indeed there
is no chapter at all on formal requisites. They are dealt with only inciden-
tally. Instead, the first chapter of the casebook introduces one commercial
instrument after another "as each came on the scene." The fascinating story
of their evolution is unfolded through the most important cases, with the
economic and cultural background supplied by introductory notes to each
section. This emphasis on growth has enabled Mr. Steffen to retain most of
the famous old cases which succinctly bring out "the controlling reasons of
policy and business practice" behind many a theory. Their color and richness
form a striking contrast to the intellectual atmosphere of some of the modern
cases. In addition, cases like Raborg v. Payton, Wells v. Brigham and many
others cannot fail to impress the student with the ingenuity of the great
1. SMITH AND MOORE, CASES ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES (3d ed. 1932) 1.
2. Commercial banks have not always been the chief creators of credit. An out-
standing exception is the practice which prevailed in the Lancashire cotton industry
until the middle of the last century. Manufacturers and traders drew bills on each
other and used the accepted bills in settlement of debts owing to other manufacturers
and traders. See 1 SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES (1939) 113. Bills of cxchange for
£10 with 120 endorsements were in circulation. Today the importance of bill and note
as payment devices in domestic transactions is negligible. This might change if, for
instance, the "neutral" (100%) money proposal were to become law. See HANSEN,
FULL RECOVERY OR STAGNATION (1938) 115, 116, referring to the practice following the
passage of the Peel Act.
3. The reviewer does not feel himself disqualified from making these observations
by the generous acknowledgment in the casebook's preface of conversations with the
editor.
1346 [Vol. 49
common-law judges, who were equal to the difficult task of translating the
customs of merchants into terms of the common-law forms of action.
The greater part of the opening chapter is devoted to the interesting
story of the development of the bill of exchange and its adaptation to changing
economic conditions. The first section, with Martin v. Bozire as the lead-off
case, introduces the bill as a transmission device. A better case for impressing
the student with the humble beginnings and amazing career of the bill could
not have been chosen. How limited was the bill's usefulness so long as the
indorsement was unknown to the business community! Indeed, to protect
the drawee who had made a payment. to a party subsequent to the payee, it
was necessary to use a second bill of exchange. Succeeding sections develop
the legal issues that arise out of the functioning of the bill of exchange, the
promissory note, and particularly of the check, as a payment. The adventures
of the bill and note as instruments of short term credit are detailed in Sections
Three, Five and Twelve. Section Three on Trade Acceptances invites the
student to consider the relative merits of trade acceptance (two name paper)
and promissory note (single name paper) as devices to finance the moving
of goods towards a market. Section Five on Note and Account Receivable
shows the extent to which the underlying transaction can be incorporated
in an instrument without destroying its negotiability. Section Twelve on
Long Form Paper (which is particularly good reading) indicates how difficult
it was for the courts of the 1860's and 1870's to overcome the barriers created
by Chief Justice Gibson's picturesque remark in Overton v. Tykr. The courts
of a rapidly expanding economy were forced to approve security clauses
unfamiliar to an economic system which knew bills and notes only as trans-
mission and payment devices.
Next follow, in logical order, sections on bonds and debentures, registered
paper and share certificates. Most exciting is Section Fourteen, which is
devoted to bonds and coupons. It deals with a problem which has long
harassed lawyers in drafting bonds: how to make a "no action clause" bind-
ing on the purchaser of a bond or coupon without destroying its negotiable
character. The story of the struggle between bond draftsmen and the courts
is particularly illuminating. Here, however, I cannot quite agree with "Mr.
Steffen's evaluation of the Illinois cases.4 He seems to imply that the Illinois
courts fail to realize the difference between the two issues presented by the
"no action clause": the negotiability issue arising in cases of stolen or lost
bonds, and the problem whether the hands of a purchaser can effectively be
tied by means of a "no action clause." I concede that the Illinois courts deny
the binding effect of the "no action clause" on the theory that it refers only
to the enforcement of the rights under the indenture and rely heavily for
this construction on cases involving conversion actions against the bona fide
purchaser of stolen bonds. But I submit that the courts, notvithstanding their
shaky theory, are guided by sound instinct. They want to protect the investor
who would otherwise be left with a rather empty right, as the Rillenlzouse
and the Moline Plow Co. cases strikingly illustrate. This is all the more
true since the individual bondholder has no other means of forcing the hands
4. At 270, 271. To this list should be added Benson v. Schwerin, 285 IlL App. 121,
1 N. E. (2d) 813 (1936).
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of the trustee under the indenture without the help of a qualified minority.5
Mr. Steffen seems to feel that incorporation of the "no action clause" in the
bond would protect the purchaser by putting him on notice. I doubt it.
Since an ordinary purchaser cannot be expected to read a voluminous bond,
it would prove to be a fictitious protection.
The arrangement of Chapters II and III, whose subjects are Transfer and
Purchase and Payment in Due Course, is not as unconventional as that of
Chapter I. But these two chapters are not therefore less interesting. Mr.
Steffen's technique of splitting each chapter into the most significant problems
and of devoting one section, headed by an introductory note, to each group
of issues, makes those problems stand out very clearly. The author's gift
for dramatic effect sustains reader interest. Outstanding are the sections
on restrictive endorsements and on the Price v. Neal situation. Section
Nineteen reveals Sections 36, 37 and 47 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
as sinister villains who triumph over justice, while Section Twenty-two,
with plot and counter-plot skillfully developed, dramatizes the victory of
virtue. Contrasts, such as those in the sections concerned with bona fide
purchasers and bona fide payers and the two sections on value, are con-
structed with precise craftsmanship.
Chapter IV, which deals with Discount and Security, is remarkable for its
original arrangement. It is an excellent idea to postpone a discussion of the
consideration doctrine until the subject of the accommodation party has been
reached. The section relating to the problems on accommodation and con-
sideration is highly interesting. Chapter V on Deposit and Collection illus-
trates strikingly the truth of Mr. Steffen's statement that "depositors live
in a banker's world." It is noteworthy that Mr. Steffen has put the Mount
Vernon National Bank case in the section devoted to direct and circuitous
routing. This is far better than discussing it in a section dealing with ac-
ceptances. The acceptance device was employed not because the drawee
bank's behavior resembled that of a traditional acceptance, but rather to
impose a high standard of care upon the bank.
Mr. Steffen's book may well serve as a model for further casebooks. Though
each constituent part is a separate entity, interrelation of the parts into a
unified structure permits a treatment of each problem both for its intrinsic
interest and as a part of the larger problems of our economic society.
By John Hannat
CASEBOOKS should be reviewed only by those who have tested them on a
class - preferably after having tried one or more other books in the same field.
It is one of the misfortunes of those who expend so much energy'and intelli-
gence in preparing a casebook, and one of the defects of the casebook review
5. The danger to the issuer by a non-enforcement of the "no action clause"
envisaged by Mr. Steffen when referring to Morris Canal and Bank Co. v. Fisher,
9 N. J. Eq. 667 (1855) does not seem to be typical.
6. See opinion of Learned Hand, J., in Babbitt v. Read, 236 Fed. 42 (C. C. A.
2d, 1916).
fProfessor of Law, Columbia University.
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as a contribution to legal writing, that the second edition of the casebook,
which affords the best opportunity for a thorough appraisal, is frequently
accorded only a brief note.
M fy position as reviewer of Mr. Steffen's volume is somewhat similar
to that of a music lover who attempts to write an essay on a symphony
whose score he has read but which he has never heard performed. I may
say at the outset, however, that Mr. Steffen's book interests me enough to
make me choose it for use in connection with an opportunity which I shall
shortly have to teach the subject of Bills and Notes.
Mr. Steffen's casebook differs from its leading competitors in several
important respects. Three of the most significant differences are his inclusion
of material relating to commercial paper other than bills and notes, his con-
sideration of certain bank problems such as those of deposit and collection,
and his emphasis on the development of the whole law of bills and notes
rather than the treatment of this part of the course as an exposition of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. He has not, however, neglected statu-
tory materials. In a removable pamphlet are printed the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law with annotations including proposed amendments, the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the New York Hofstadter
Act and the Bank Collection Code. Notes to the cases contain numerous
references to relevant statutes.
The book is arranged in five chapters, each broken down into sections de-
signed to present materials sufficient for one day's discussion. Most of the cases
are followed by notes and many cases are preceded by several paragraphs of
text. The notes chiefly contain abstracts of important cases accompanied by
few other citations. Many of the notes also contain questions pointing to
possible lines of discussion. The author includes numerous observations of
his own, frequently in the shrewd and mordant language which doubtless
characterizes what he says to his own students. In view of the subject matter,
Mr. Steffen has wisely refrained from any attempt at an exhaustive coverage
of authorities. But he does cite significant books and articles, and has
supplemented the notes with an important general list of law review articles.
The first chapter on Types of Paper includes sections on bills and notes,
bank paper, bonds, coupons and share certificates. Chapter II which treats
the subject of Transfer, contains the Pricc v. Neal situation. In Chapter
III, on Purchase and Payment in Due Course, there is included in addition
to the expected topics one section dealing with bank credit as yalue. Chapter
IV, on Discount and Securities, contains many other sections, several relat-
ing to suretyship. The final chapter contains five sections on Deposit and
Collection.
Mr. Steffen has rigorously edited his cases and has consistently kept his
materials within the bounds of his outlines. For example, lie has not wandered
off into by-paths of corporate finance merely because he has dealt with certain
problems of investment paper. A course based on his book is open to a good
deal of expansion, but even if only his book is covered, it will add greatly
to the student's professional equipment. The student will require repeated
counsel constantly to use the statutory materials, but the author leaves no
instructor in doubt as to the necessity of this advice. Finally, in the familiar
19401 REVIEWVS 1349
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
words of all casebook reviewers, and quite appropriately in this instance,
Mr. Steffen has made a contribution. He has presented a neat challenge
to the instruction methods of workers in the field of commercial paper. -le
will also be responsible for much cerebral activity on the part of those who
will want to compete with him either in the mastery of the subject or in
the manufacture of casebooks.
THE RESIDENCE AND DoiMICIL OF CORPORATIONS. By A. Farnsworth. Lon-
don: Butterworth & Co., 1939. Pp. xxxvii, 370. 21s.
THE problem of corporate residence is particularly important in English
law because of the income tax on corporations "resident" or "ordinarily
resident" in England. To a lesser extent, the question has also come up in
connection with jurisdictional problems and the determination of the enemy
character of corporations in wartime. But despite this frequency of litiga-
tion, the subject has been enveloped in considerable confusion. In the present
work the author, a member of the English Revenue Department, sets out to
make an exhaustive study of the field.
Because status and capacity are today determined in the chief continental
countries by the law of nationality- domicil playing only a subordinate role
-the author gives but a summary description of the continental law and
literature on corporate residence. He makes a detailed and critical study
of the English decisions and commentaries, considering also the American
law on the point. Despite the similarity of the American and English ap-
proaches to general Conflict of Laws problems, he finds little that is profit-
able in American law, largely because of his belief that American judges,
influenced by the eighteenth century doctrine that a corporation can exist
only in the state of its incorporation, always hold that it cannot have a resi-
dence or domicil in any other place. The author repeatedly states this view,
seemingly ignorant of its qualification in the so-called "commercial domicil"
of corporations for tax purposes."
England long ago cast aside the metaphysical notion, premised upon an
idea of actual corporate existence, that a corporation can reside only in the
place of its incorporation. As the income tax law distinguishes between
corporations "resident" in England, which are assessed on all their profits,
and corporations merely "doing business" in England, which are assessed
only on their profits made in England, the mere carrying on of business in
England, on however large a scale, can not be made the criterion for determin-
ing residence. The persistent notion that English corporations always reside
at their English registered office was set at rest in 1929 when the House
of Lords decided that incorporation alone was not conclusive of residence.2
The House had already held by an evenly divided vote that a trading com-
1. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); First Bank Corp.
v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937); Southern Nat. Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S.
148 (1937).
2. Egyptian Delta Land & Inv. Co., Ltd. v. Todd [1929] A. C. 1.
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pany, registered under the British Companies Act but controlled by an inde-
pendent board of directors resident in a foreign country, was not liable as
a resident on the whole of its profits.3 Mr. Farnsworth concludes from his
investigation of the English cases that a corporation's residence for income
tax purposes is the place of its central control and management- the place
where its directors meet and determine the corporation's policies. As a
trading corporation may simultaneously be managed in different countries,
English law seems to permit a corporation to have several residences.
The problem has often arisen whether foreign corporations are carrying
on business in England in such a way as to constitute them residents subject
to the jurisdiction of English courts. Recent cases support Mr. Farnsworth's
view that the English courts which used the term "residence" in connection
with jurisdictional problems were ill-advised, for the only question before
those courts was whether the foreign corporation could be "found" in England
-that is, physically present for the purpose of being served. It could have
been said that a corporation was physically present if it carried on business
at a fixed place in England by a person with power to bind the corporation.
One decision has gone so far as to hold that the carrying on of business for
nine days under these conditions was sufficient to give the English courts
jurisdiction.4 Mr. Farnsworth holds that this does not constitute "residence"
in the case of individuals, nor corporate "residence" within the income tax
meaning of the term.
The question of residence in connection with "commercial domicir' is next
cofisidered. In case of war, the enemy character of an individual or corpora-
tion is established by his or its "commercial domicil," which actually is the
same as its "residence." The "residence" criterion set up by the English
courts for this purpose appears to be the same as for income tax cases-
the place of the corporation's central control and management. Inasmuch
as the mere holding of a majority of a company's shares does not constitute
control, the enemy character of a corporation is not determined by its share-
holders' nationality.
The British interpretation of an enemy corporation differs greatly from the
American definition found in the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917.5
An enemy corporation is there defined as one "incorporated within such
territory of any nation with which the United States is at war or incor-
porated within any country other than the United States and doing business
within such territory." The author asserts that, prior to the Act, the tradi-
tional theory that a corporation resides or is domiciled within the state of its
incorporation had prevented American courts from developing rules based
upon control or some other theory involving the residence of corporations
outside the countries of their origin. This statement hardly seems warranted,
for the question of the wartime "commercial domicil" of corporations has
arisen so seldom that there has been no opportunity for devising special rules
of corporate residence.
3. Mitchell v. Egyptian Hotels, Ltd. [1915] A. C. 1022.
4. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Actien-Gesellschaft Ffir Motor, etc., [1902]
1 K. B. 342.
5. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 24(2) (1934).
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Mr. Farnsworth's discovery that the question of a corporation's "domicil"
has never directly come before a British court obliges him to deal with the
subject on the basis of "first principles." These lead him to the conclusion
that a corporation acquires a domicil of origin at the moment it comes into
existence in the country to whose laws it owes its being. It can acquire a
residence in another country with the necessary animus manendi. In the case
of individuals, this animus would constitute a domicil of choice. But the
author argues that attributing a domicil of choice to corporations by law
would have impracticable consequences, for as status is commonly governed
by the law of the domicil, a corporation able to choose its domicil would be
able to change its status and personality almost at will. That a person, or
a corporation, may have different domicils for different purposes seems in-
conceivable to him.
Much of the confusion which envelopes the subject of corporate residence
has arisen from indiscriminate use of terms by judges and writers. Mr.
Farnsworth's careful use of words together with his searching analysis of
court opinions and commentaries make his book a highly commendable
addition to a subject which has received little treatment in England. Less
impressive, however, is his extremely conceptual approach to legal problems.
Residence, domicil, status, capacity and other legalisms have fixed meanings
for the author. He is convinced that, if he can establish a proposition for
individuals, he also has the answer for corporations - without regard to the
fact that economic or social factors may dictate a different result. Mr. Farns-
worth's "first principles", which derive from the English law relating to the
domicil of individuals, therefore furnish an entirely insufficient basis for his
conclusions regarding corporations. That the issue of a corporation's "domicil"
has never been squarely presented to an English court should have made the
author hesitate before urging the claims of corporate "domicil." It is true
that American courts and writers sometimes refer to the state under whose
laws a corporation was organized as its "domicil." But since the term as
applied to corporations - unlike the domicil of natural persons - has only
a technical and not a popular meaning, it is useless to talk about the "domicil"
of a corporation when such descriptive terms as the state of origin or charter
or incorporation will fully answer all purposes.
ERNEST G. LORENZENt
PAROLE WVITIH HONOR. By William LaRoe, Jr. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1939. Pp. xi, 295. $3.00.
THERE are many wide-spread misconceptions concerning parole. The aver-
age layman is led to believe that parole is a form of leniency extended to all
criminals, and that the elimination of parole would result in a diminution of
crime. On the other hand, many penologists consider parole the best type of
release procedure-a necessary adjunct to any logical rehabilitation program
commenced when the offender enters a prison, and a means of safeguarding
the community against recidivism. Such divergence of opinion demands clari-
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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fication of the problem. Cognizant of this need, the author of Parole Witl
Honor, a member of the District of Columbia Parole Board, has written a
book which deals with the nature, purposes, difficulties, and Upcration of
parole.
Parole is the release of a prisoner from a penal instituti.n tafter lie has
served at least his minimum term) under the continued custudy of the s tate
and upon the condition that he will be reincarcerated for any violation of pa-
role regulations. The granting of parole is not in any sense leniency; rather
it is permission to serve a portion of a sentence outside of prison. The al-
vantage of releasing men under supervision is apparent. Certainly society is
better protected if it retains a string over an offender after his discharge fro ,m
prison, instead of permitting him to move unsupervised in the co-mimunity.
Parole, in principle, is a desirable attribute of any penal system. But its
administration has been successful in only about ten jurisdictions. The re-
maining states maintain a parole system in name only. The reason for the
shortcomings of parole administration in these jurisdictions is frequently a
matter of insufficient personnel. Parole boards often con-ist of part-time
members who are unable to give their undivided attention to the cases which
must be considered. Consequently, many undeserving felons arc liherated.
Several states have but a few parole officers to supervise parolees, many of
whom report by mail. Obviously, unless provisions are made for full-time
boards and adequate personnel, a parole system cannot be properly adminis-
tered.
Parole is a logical concept which has been tacked on to an illogical and out-
moded penal system. Those who legislated parole into existence unfortunately
ignored the prerequisite to any successful parole system: rehabilitation of
those who are later to be released. Inasmuch as parole is the last phase
of the whole process of correctional treatment, it is of little value unle,- we
first reform the inmate while he is in prison. The perfection of parole ttch-
nique must then await a thoroughgoing revision of our present treatment of
prisoners. While I am able to say from personal knowledge that many prison
officials attempt to help their charges, we are frequently frustrated in our
attempts because of inadequate facilities. The author states significantly:
"That the parole system is most helpful in assisting young men to face the
world again cannot be denied. But the basic problem remains unsolved bie-
cause so many of our penal institutions are ill-equipped for the rebuilding
of men."
Parolees often revert to crime, the author maintains, becase they cann ,t
find employment. One convicted of a crime cannot hold a civil service or
other government position; he cannot join the army or navy. He is frequently
barred from procuring a license to practice the trade he learned while in prin-
on. I agree whole-heartedly with the author's statement that "the rigid pulicy
of our government in closing its doors to persons convicted of crime is typical
of a too general public attitude toward the released prisuiner. The average
employer looks upon him in much the same way as he would look on a
leper. It is elementary that a man, whether an ex-prisoner or not, cannot
maintain his self-respect over a long period of time without employment. Yet
we deny to the ex-prisoner the right to work, and at the same time expect the
parole system to operate successfully." I might add that I receive an aver-
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age of two to three hundred letters a week from former inmates of Sing Sing
and other institutions, who plead with me to help them obtain employment.
Not infrequently, such men later return to the prison gates as parole violators.
The cause of their misfortune and their failure as parolees is obvious.
Sometimes even legislators are deluded into believing that parole is a form
of leniency. This is apparent when we examine many state statutes which
provide that those who have committed the more serious types of offenses
such as murder, rape and robbery, can not be paroled. What is the practical
result of such absurdity? Those offenders are eventually released (at the ex-
piration of their sentences) unsupervised. The author criticizes such a state
of affairs. "When we come to realize that parole is a method of protecting
the community against the offender, by attaching restrictive conditions to
his release, it becomes clear that the more dangerous offenders are the ones
against whom the community most needs to be protected by a restricted form
of release and by close supervision after his release." What is more, "Em-
phasis should be shifted from the question as to who should be paroled to
the question as to the time when the offender should be paroled."
The author also reminds us that even in those states which maintain efficient
parole set-ups, some parolees violate the conditions of parole. But that does
not mean that parole is a failure. Indeed, the return of violators to prison
often indicates that officials are closely watching their charges and declaring
them delinquent as soon as it is apparent that they are apt to revert to lawless-
ness. Statistics show, however, that the amount of crime committed by pa-
roled men is very small in proportion to the total of all crime. Certainly we
are justified in concluding that men supervised after their release from prison
are less apt to return to their old haunts and associates and are less subject to
new temptations than are men who are untrammelled by any obligation to
the state.
The author also discusses such other important topics as the social back-
ground of criminals, the police and parole, the judge and parole, the barrier
of state lines, the future of parole and the machinery of parole. He further
describes the procedure of the parole hearing and points out the methods used
by parole boards when interviewing those who apply for release. He has
drawn from his experience in dealing with criminals to illustrate his points
with many case histories taken from the files of parole boards. Of extreme
interest is the appendix which contains a declaration of the principles of
parole, a table of the disposition of parole applications by the United States
Board of Parole during the years 1930-1938, and the parole laws of various
states.
Parole With Honor has been written by an expert in the field. He treats
every topic fairly and in a scholarly fashion. His book should be read by
everyone interested in the parole problem and particularly by those who
clamor for the abolition of parole without having the slightest notion of the
subject. The book contains a wealth of information about a form of release
procedure which, although still imperfect, has proven itself to be the most
effective and logical means yet devised of helping the released prisoner adjust
himself to community life.
LEwis E. LAWES t
tWarden, Sing Sing Prison, New York.
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